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Abstract
While PKI applications differ in how they use keys, all ap-
plications share one assumption: users have keypairs. In
previous work, we established that desktop keystores are
not safe places to store private keys, because the TCB is
too large. These keystores are also immobile, difficult to
use, and make it impossible for relying parties to make
reasonable trust judgments. Since we would like to use
desktops as PKI clients and cannot realistically expect
to redesign the entire desktop, this paper presents a sys-
tem that works within the confines of modern desktops to
shrink the TCB needed for PKI applications. Our system
(called Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy (SHEMP))
shrinks the TCB in space and allows the TCB’s size to
vary over time and over various application sensitivity
levels, thus making desktops usable for PKI.
1 Introduction
Because public-key cryptography can enable secure in-
formation exchange between parties that do not share se-
crets a priori, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has long
promised the vision of enabling secure information ser-
vices in large, distributed populations. A number of useful
applications become possible with PKI. While the appli-
cations differ in how they use keys (e.g., S/MIME uses
the key for message encryption and signing, while client-
side SSL uses the key for authentication), all applications
share one assumption: users have keypairs.
Where these user keypairs are stored and used is the pri-
mary focus of this research. Traditionally, users either
put their key on some sort of hardware device such as
a smart card or USB token, or they place it directly on
the hard disk such as in a browser or system keystore.
Most modern operating systems (such as Windows and
Mac OSX) include a keystore and a set of Cryptographic
∗Preliminary versions of some of this research appear in Dartmouth
College Technical Report TR2004-525 [11].
Service Providers (CSPs) which use the key. In fact, many
cross-platform software systems, such as the Java Run-
time and the Netscape/Mozilla Web browser include their
own keystore so that they may use a user’s keypair with-
out having to rely on the underlying OS (thus enhancing
portability).
1.1 Keystores
Most keystores fall into one of four basic categories:
• A software token stores the key on disk (most likely
in some sort of encrypted format). Examples of this
approach include the default CSP for Windows and
the Mozilla/Netscape Web browser.
• A hardware token stores the key and performs key
operations. The interaction between an application
and the key is typically mediated by the OS (although
in some cases, the application may interact with the
device directly). In order for the OS or application
to be able to speak to the token, the token vendor
must provide a driver for the device which adheres
to one of the two common standards for communi-
cating with cryptographic devices: the CryptoAPI
(CAPI) for Microsoft, and RSA’s PKCS#11 for the
rest of the world. Examples of hardware tokens in-
clude the Aladdin eToken and Spyrus USB tokens, as
well as more powerful devices (sometimes referred
to as cryptographic accelerators or Hardware Secu-
rity Modules (HSM)).
• A secure coprocessor stores the key, can perform key
operations internally using cryptographic hardware,
and can even house the applications directly, such as
the IBM 4758 [3, 30]. These devices can also be used
as cryptographic accelerators or HSMs.
• A credential repository is a dedicated machine that
stores private keys for a number of users. When
a user Alice wishes to perform key operations, she
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must first authenticate to the repository. The reposi-
tory then certifies a temporary key with Alice’s per-
manent key via a digital signature, or actively partic-
ipates in the requested key operation. Examples of
credential repositories include MyProxy [18], hard-
ened MyProxy [9], and SEM [2].
In previous work, we examined the security aspects of
some of the standard keystores and the their interaction
with the desktop [15, 16]. We concluded that software
tokens are not safe places to store private keys, and we
demonstrated the permeability of keystores such as the
Microsoft default CSP and the Mozilla keystore. Our ex-
periments showed that in many cases, an attacker can eas-
ily keyjack: either steal the private key or use it at will.
In addition to being unsafe, standard software keystores
have the disadvantage of being immobile. Once a private
key is installed on a desktop, the only way to transport it to
another machine is to export it and re-import it on the new
machine. Since this process can make the key vulnerable
to attack, such solutions may often offer mobility at the
expense of security. As user populations become more
mobile and begin to use multiple devices, this immobility
becomes more problematic.
Hardware tokens claim to solve both of these problems;
they get the key off of the desktop and give users mobil-
ity. We experimented with these devices and found that
an attacker is typically still able to use the key at will.
However, with respect to mobility, devices such as USB
tokens can add some benefit, provided that the appropri-
ate software is installed on each machine and that users
use supported OSes (but the tokens we experimented with
did not have Apple or Linux support at the time of our
experimentation).
We concluded that the security problems of software and
hardware tokens stem from the facts that the Trusted Com-
puting Base (TCB) is too large and ill-defined, and that us-
ability issues make it hard for users and application devel-
opers to “do the right thing” [15, 16]. These shortcomings
make it impossible for relying parties to make reasonable
trust judgments about the system.
Secure Coprocessors Secure coprocessors are a combi-
nation of physical armor and software protections that
create a device that possesses a different security domain
from its host machine. Such devices can be used to shrink
the TCB, and have been shown to be feasible as commer-
cial products [3, 30] and can even run Linux and modern
build tools [6]. We have explored using secure copro-
cessors for trusted computing—both as general designs
(e.g., [21]) as well as real prototypes (e.g., [7])—but re-
peatedly were hampered by their relatively weak com-
putational power. Their relatively high cost also inhibits
widespread adoption, particularly at clients. Their lack
of ubiquity, coupled with their sometimes awkward pro-
gramming environments lead us to conclude that secure
coprocessors are difficult to use, especially for application
developers.
In other previous work, we used the Trusted Comput-
ing Group’s (TCG) specifications and hardware (a device
known as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)) to secure
an entire desktop [10, 13, 14]. While the security prop-
erties of our platform (called Bear) are not as strong as a
secure coprocessor such as the IBM 4758, our approach
shrinks the TCB of a general purpose desktop.
Credential Repositories Credential repositories can pro-
vide safe storage facilities for private keys as well as give
users mobility. The repository approach allows an or-
ganization to focus security resources on the repository,
thus providing economies of scale. In terms of secure
key storage, repositories significantly shrink the TCB. The
private key no longer relies on a general purpose and
buggy desktop for safe storage, but instead on a dedi-
cated server which is presumably administered by a pro-
fessional. Repositories allow users to access their private
key from multiple machines, thus giving them mobility.
However, when a user Alice wishes to use her private key
to perform some operations, she must either bring it to
her desktop, or design or use a protocol which allows her
to use the private key on the repository and rewrite her
application to use the new protocol. Thus, repositories can
be difficult to use, especially for application developers.
Recently, a credential repository has been developed by
the Grid computing community which provides both se-
curity and mobility to clients. Their repository is called
MyProxy [18], and there have even been efforts to harden
a MyProxy repository by using an IBM 4758 for key stor-
age and cryptographic operations [9].
1.2 The Problem
As we will establish in Section 2, a usable key storage
solution must be secure, must be usable, must give users
mobility, and must allow relying parties to make reason-
able trust judgments. As we have discussed in this section,
none of the current approaches meet this criteria. Table 1
summarizes the status quo.
SHEMP The status quo is not satisfactory. Ideally, we
need a way to use a desktop as a PKI client that answers
“yes” in all of the columns of Table 1. Since we cannot
redesign the entire desktop and expect anyone to use it,
our solution must operate within the confines of modern
desktops. Additionally, in order to remain usable to appli-
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Keystore Secure Usable Mobile
Software Token no no no
Hardware Token no no maybe
Coprocessors yes maybe no
Repositories maybe no yes
Table 1: A summary of modern keystores.
cation developers, it must adhere to common development
paradigms and practices.
Our solution (SHEMP) builds on MyProxy, secure hard-
ware, and policy tools. We extend the MyProxy approach
by taking advantage of potentially heterogeneous secure
hardware on the client and repository. We also extend
the MyProxy design by exploring the use of Proxy Cer-
tificates (PCs) for applications beyond mere authentica-
tion. We use the eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) to provide a mechanism which allows
users to specify their key usage options based on the client
and repository properties. We have built a SHEMP proto-
type and constructed a testbed and have conducted per-
formance and user studies. The repository and one client
currently run on our Bear TCPA/TCG platform. All of
this code will be available for public download.
This Paper Section 2 examines the problem in detail and
Section 3 discusses the criteria that a solution to the prob-
lem should meet. Section 4 discusses the SHEMP toolkit
and Section 5 applies those tools to build the SHEMP sys-
tem. In Section 6, we offer an evaluation of SHEMP and
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Problem
The problem that we are attempting to solve is that mod-
ern desktops are unsuitable for use as PKI clients. They
can allow a user’s private key to be stolen or used at an
attacker’s will, they make it difficult for users (and ap-
plication authors) to do the “right thing”, they are inher-
ently immobile, and they do not allow relying parties to
make good trust judgments about the system (i.e., they
allow the key to be used for transactions which the user
was not aware of or did not intend). A more detailed de-
scription of the experiments used to draw this conclusion
can be found in previous work (see [15, 16]); this section
presents a brief analysis of some of those results.
Software A major cause of the problem is the complex-
ity of modern software. This complexity makes it diffi-
cult or impossible for users to draw conclusions about a
given computation’s results. Complexity also decreases
the system’s usability, and decreased usability often re-
sults in decreased security. Complexity also expands the
set of software that must be trusted in order for the system
to operate correctly. This set of software is often referred
to as the TCB. A good discussion of the TCB can be found
in the “Orange Book” [19]. A small TCB minimizes the
attacker’s target and maximizes the chance for developers
to build secure systems.
Placing a private key on such a complex system is prob-
lematic. By exploiting the complexity, it is possible for an
attacker to trick users into giving away their key directly,
or use it for purposes which they are unaware of or did
not intend. By exploiting the fact that so much of a com-
plex system needs to be trusted in order for it to behave
correctly, it is possible for an attacker to either get the key
directly, or be able to use it at will without alerting the
key’s owner. We found that getting one user-level exe-
cutable (i.e., our keyjacking malware) to run on the client
is enough to accomplish a successful attack.
Hardware Many in the field suggest getting the private
key off of the desktop altogether and placing it in a sep-
arate secure device of some sort. Taking the key to a
specialty device such as an inexpensive USB token would
seem to reduce the likelihood of key theft as well as shrink
the amount of software which has to be trusted in order for
the system to be secure. At first glance, it would appear
that just the device and the software which provides ac-
cess to the device (i.e., its CSP) need to be trusted. We
found that relying on such a device is also problematic.
While putting the private key on a token gives some phys-
ical security and makes it harder to steal the key, we found
that it does not shrink the TCB (since the adversary can
still borrow the key via host-side attacks).
Secure coprocessing is an improvement from a security
standpoint, but it is not a magic bullet either. From a prac-
tical standpoint, high end devices such as the IBM 4758
are far too expensive to deploy at every client. On the
other end of the spectrum, lower priced devices (e.g., the
TPM) cannot withstand many common attacks (such as
hardware attacks, or attacks from root) without additional
measures (e.g., aid from the processor, such as what is
being considered in the literature [8, 17, 31, 32]).
Immobility In addition to the security and cost consider-
ations mentioned above, the desktop PKI client paradigm
suffers another problem: immobility. Modern comput-
ing environments are becoming increasingly distributed
and user populations are becoming increasingly mobile.
Moreover, the number of computing devices that a typical
user owns is growing. It is not uncommon for someone to
own a desktop, a laptop, a cell phone, and a PDA. Which
device(s) should house the private key?
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One proposal is to use inexpensive tokens such as USB to-
kens and allow users to carry their token with them across
devices and computing environments. This approach has
a number of drawbacks in addition to the security prob-
lems mentioned above. First, some devices may not have
the proper hardware or software installed, or may not have
support altogether. Second, a particular machine may
not be trustworthy, or may have malware installed which
abuses the private key. Again, putting the private key in a
token does not shrink the TCB.
Another proposal is to move the key around on some re-
movable media (e.g., a floppy) and export the key to some
intermediate format (e.g., PKCS#12) and then import the
key at the destination. This approach suffers a number
of drawbacks as well. First, some devices may not sup-
port the media—e.g., we are unaware of cell phones with
floppy drives. Second, the intermediate format may be in-
secure (e.g., as Peter Gutmann has demonstrated with his
breakms [5] tool).
3 Criteria for a Solution
In order for any proposed solution to succeed in making
desktops usable for PKI, it must address a range of issues
including security, usability, and mobility. For the solu-
tion to be of any practical interest, it must safely store and
use the private key, give application developers flexibility
while maintaining security, match the model of real world
user populations, and allow relying parties to make rea-
sonable judgments about the system.
3.1 Security
The notion of security is difficult or impossible to quan-
tify in a practical system. Within a formal framework,
one can prove that a system is secure, but once the formal
frameworks give way to implementations, problems often
arise. We let the operating definition of security in this
paper involve minimizing the risk, impact, and window of
opportunity for misuse of a user’s private key.
3.1.1 Minimizing Risk
The TCB and Security We define the TCB for PKI appli-
cations to be the private key and the set of software which
stores and uses the private key directly (e.g., libraries that
make up constructs such as the CryptoAPI). The security
trouble of Section 2 results from the fact that this set of
software is intertwined with the OS and applications (such
as Internet Explorer), and no clear boundaries exist. The
result is that the entire system must be trusted in order
for the system to be secure; just one well-crafted piece of
malware can subvert the entire desktop, rendering it inef-
fective as a PKI client.
The TCB and Secure Hardware Secure hardware can
reduce the size of the TCB. Highly secure devices such
as the IBM 4758 [3, 30] can effectively create an entirely
separate security domain from their host. Since the de-
vice has a general-purpose OS, it can house applications
as well as critical data (e.g., private keys), thus eliminat-
ing the need for the private key to come in contact with
the host desktop at all. The end result is that the en-
tire TCB can be placed in such a device and be totally
protected. However, as discussed in Section 1, devices
like the IBM 4758 are expensive, which prohibits their
widespread use on client platforms.
While few devices can isolate the TCB to the extent of
the IBM 4758, other devices can reduce the TCB. For
instance, many HSMs can get the key off of the desk-
top, perform key operations internally, and protect against
physical attack. However, the applications may still live
on the desktop, leaving the device only as secure as the
CSP and leaving part of the TCB on the desktop (hardened
MyProxy follows this approach [9]. Other approaches,
such as our “Bear” [10, 13, 14] project and others [26],
can use a TPM to extend a weaker level of security to the
entire desktop. This may be sufficient, depending on the
threat model.
Use Secure Hardware When Available In SHEMP, ma-
chines which house users’ private keys are called key
repositories. Machines which actually use the key on a
user’s behalf are called clients. We envision (and pro-
totyped) a heterogeneous environment, where machines
(both repositories and clients) may have very secure hard-
ware such as an IBM 4758 secure coprocessor, less secure
hardware such as our “Bear” platform, or no secure hard-
ware at all.
Organizations which aim to provide high levels of secu-
rity will adopt a threat model which assumes a power-
ful attacker. Under such a threat model, key repositories
should be able to withstand a wide range of attacks. For
instance, an organization may wish to assume that an at-
tacker can get root privileges on the repository’s host ma-
chine. This would imply that the attacker can watch any
process’s memory, and run any code of his choice on the
host. Furthermore, the organization may wish to assume
that an attacker has physical access to the secure hardware
holding the private keys and can attempt to perform local
hardware attacks. As a result, that organization’s reposi-
tory should be able to resist local physical and software at-
tacks, and should refuse to disclose any user’s private key,
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even if the attack is running with root privileges. In prac-
tice, this may involve using a device such as an IBM 4758
to house the repository, thus giving the repository a dif-
ferent security domain than its host. The threat model for
clients may be different, and a successful solution should
allow for such variations and be flexible enough to accom-
modate clients with a range of security levels, as well as
provide a means for expressing those security levels.
Moving the TCB off of the Desktop Roughly speaking,
the larger the desktop-resident TCB, the greater the risk
of key disclosure. If we assume that client machines will
be running standard OSes, then we should minimize the
amount of the TCB that resides on the client machine.
The ideal scenario is one in which no part of the TCB
comes into contact with the client machine, although this
approach also makes desktops unusable as PKI clients (as
no part of the desktop—including applications—can be
used in any PKI operation). A compromise could consist
of keeping the TCB out of the reach of a desktop until
some portion of the TCB is needed, and only then, would
we embed part of the desktop in the TCB.
3.1.2 Minimizing Impact
In order to minimize the impact of a key disclosure and the
window of opportunity for an attacker to misuse the key,
we need some way to control the lifespan during which a
compromised key can be used. A short key lifespan re-
duces the opportunity for misuse. However, just issuing
short-lived private keys to the population would increase
the already cumbersome administrative burden of the PKI,
as users would have to be re-keyed frequently. To remedy
this, a number of systems rely on delegation to control the
lifespan of a user’s credentials. By using delegation, we
can issue a temporary credential which, when evaluated
in conjunction with a long-term credential such as a PKI
certificate, allows a relying party to make a reasonable
trust judgment. Should a short-term credential be com-
promised by an attacker, the attacker can only misuse the
temporary credential for a short period of time, thus mini-
mizing the impact and window of opportunity for misuse.
3.2 Usability
The second feature that a proposed solution should pro-
vide is usability. Users, administrators, and application
developers must be able construct accurate mental mod-
els of the system. From a user’s perspective, the system
must be easy to use. A design strategy which can en-
hance usability involves hiding complexity from the user.
Clearly, there is a balance to be achieved; hiding too much
complexity can have adverse effects, as can exposing too
much. The system should hide enough complexity so that
users are not overwhelmed by configuration options (in
which case, they are likely to misuse and/or misconfig-
ure the system—most likely resulting in security trouble).
However, enough complexity should be visible so that
users can construct a valid mental model of the system.
The requirements for an administrator’s view can be dif-
ferent. Typically, an administrator is a special entity who
has a deeper knowledge of the system, and as a result, can
be burdened with some of the complexity. In many sce-
narios, it is the administrator’s role to insulate the end user
from complexity. However, in order to deal with this com-
plexity, administrators should be given tools which aid in
system configuration and use. Furthermore, the toolkit
should make it difficult for administrators to do the wrong
thing, and easy for them to do the right one.
In order to get parties to write applications for the sys-
tem, it should expose common programming paradigms
to developers, and allow them to use the solution to build
and deploy real applications. This requires that the plat-
form must be easily programmable with modern tools,
and must also allow easy maintenance and upgrade of its
software. Forcing developers to conform to awkward or
constraining mechanisms limits the usability of the sys-
tem from a developer’s viewpoint.
3.3 Mobility
The third feature that a proposed solution must provide is
mobility. Modern user populations increasingly use mul-
tiple computing platforms from multiple locations. Many
current PKI systems either make it difficult for the user to
move their private key or make it vulnerable to attack dur-
ing and/or after transit. A PKI solution must allow users to
move throughout their domain, and across their comput-
ing platforms. Most importantly, the solution should not
put the private key at risk of disclosure any time the user
moves geographically or uses different devices. A good
solution should take into account the trustworthiness of
the client platform, thus disallowing the key to migrate to
untrustable client machines (or severely limiting its use).
4 Our Building Blocks
Our primary building blocks consist of three categories:
a credential repository (MyProxy) and delegation frame-
work (Proxy Certificates (PCs)) which are used to get keys
off of the desktops and give users mobility; secure hard-
ware which can be used as the basic keystore, both at
repositories and clients, when available; and a policy lan-
guage which is used to express key usage and delegation
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policies at the repository as well as express attributes of
repositories and clients.
4.1 MyProxy and Proxy Certificates
The first component we use to build SHEMP is the
MyProxy credential repository, which we use to shrink
the TCB and give users mobility [18]. MyProxy was orig-
inally designed to allow Grid users to obtain and delegate
access to their credentials from multiple locations on the
Grid. Modern versions of MyProxy [9] use the repository
to store a long-term credential, thus getting the private key
off of the user’s desktop altogether (in fact, Lorch et al. [9]
store the key in an IBM 4758 at the repository). When a
user, or process running on a user’s behalf, needs to use
a credential for authentication or authorization, it logs in
to the MyProxy repository and requests that a short-lived
PC be generated. The PC along with the user’s long-term
credential can then be used for authentication or autho-
rization.
The MyProxy system is attractive for two reasons. First, it
gets the user’s private key off of the desktop entirely, and
thus shrinks the TCB. When a user or process needs to
use a credential, the TCB expands to include the desktop
(via delegation)—but only for short period of time. This
approach shrinks the TCB in space and time which, in
turn, gives MyProxy a security advantages over the stan-
dard desktop PKI approach. Second, the MyProxy sys-
tem gives users mobility. Since the user’s private key
is stored in a central location, it can be accessed from
many locations without having to be transported by hand
(i.e., exporting/re-importing or using a protocol like Sa-
cred [23, 24, 25]).
Proxy Certificates The second component we use in
SHEMP are PCs. PCs allow us to expand the TCB for
to cover a client machine for a short period of time. We
chose X.509 Proxy Certificates for a number of reasons.
First, they are standardized by the IETF and are awaiting
an RFC number assignment. Second, because they are
X.509-based, they can be used in many places in the ex-
isting infrastructure that are already outfitted to deal with
X.509 certificates. Third, they are widely used in the Grid
community and are used in the MyProxy system and in the
dominant middleware for Grid deployments: the Globus
Toolkit [4]. Fourth, they allow dynamic delegation with-
out the help of a third party, allowing clients to obtain a PC
without having to endure the cumbersome vetting process
at the Certificate Authority (CA). Last, the PC standard
defines a Proxy Certificate Information (PCI) X.509 ex-
tension which can be used to carry a wide variety of (pos-
sibly domain-specific) policy statements (e.g., XACML
statements, discussed below).
4.2 Secure Hardware
The third component we use in SHEMP is secure hard-
ware, which allows us to shrink the TCB of each ma-
chine. Over the years, our lab has built a number of sys-
tems which involve and/or enhance secure coprocessors.
Secure hardware is interesting in the context of SHEMP
because it can be used to reduce the size of the TCB, thus
reducing the risk of a key disclosure.
Most of our initial systems were constructed around the
IBM 4758, as the second author brought it to the PKI Lab
from IBM [3, 27, 30]. Members of our group have used
these devices to enhance privacy [7], harden PKI [12, 28],
and enhance S/MIME [21].
The IBM 4758 is a secure coprocessor which provides se-
cure storage facilities, cryptographic acceleration, and a
platform on which to run third-party applications. The
IBM 4758 is a very secure device, having been validated
to FIPS 140-1 Level 4. It can withstand both software
and hardware attacks, and effectively provides a different
security domain from its host machine. A useful feature
of the IBM 4758 is what it calls Outbound Authentica-
tion (known as attestation in many other contexts), which
enables applications running inside of the IBM 4758 to
authenticate themselves to remote parties [29]. A good
overview of the IBM 4758 and its capabilities can be
found in the literature (e.g., [3, 27, 30]).
More recent projects have involved constructing a “vir-
tual” coprocessor out of commodity hardware. Our ini-
tial design and prototype was based on the TCG specifi-
cation (see [20, 33, 34, 35]) and was called “Bear” [13].
The Bear platform is less secure than the IBM 4758. It
does provide a means to ensure file integrity for files
which a possibly remote Security Admin decides are nec-
essary. However, since the design is based on the TCG
specification and hardware, it is susceptible to local hard-
ware attacks, as well as attacks from root [10, 13]. Bear
has a mechanism which allows it to “attest” to the in-
tegrity of the platform when challenged. The TCG spec-
ifications refer to this mechanism as attestation. More
information about Bear can be found in previous work
(e.g., [10, 13]), and a summary of the attestation mech-
anism can be found in earlier work [10] as well as the
literature (e.g., [20, 26, 33, 34, 35]).
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4.3 Policy
The last tool we use in SHEMP is a policy framework.
In order to enhance SHEMP’s the expressiveness and us-
ability, we want to give users a way to relay their wishes
regarding key usage to relying parties and applications—
and to the SHEMP system itself. Further, we want the
SHEMP system to be able to convey attributes of both key
repositories and clients to relying parties.
In one role, the policy framework should allow a relying
party Bob, upon receiving a PC from Alice, to be able to
discover the conditions under which Alice’s PC was gen-
erated. Then, Bob can decide for himself whether to trust
Alice, given her current environment. As we will explore
in detail in Section 5, SHEMP administrators assign at-
tributes to clients and repositories. When Alice makes a
request for the repository to generate a PC for her, the
repository will include the attributes of the client desktop
and the repository in the PC itself (in the PCI extension).
These attributes essentially define Alice’s TCB. When Al-
ice presents her PC to Bob, he can examine the attributes
himself, and then make a trust decision based on Alice’s
TCB.
In another role, the policy framework should allow a key-
holder Alice to express her wishes about uses of her pri-
vate key—potentially based on the security level of the
repository and end client platform. For example, users
may wish to restrict access to cryptographic operations
that the repository will perform with their private key; ap-
plications may wish to restrict certain data or operations.
Without this ability, a successful attacker could fully im-
personate the victim or use the victim’s key for any oper-
ation. The policy framework must be flexible enough to
allow SHEMP administrators to specify domain-specific
attributes to machines, and easy enough to use that users
and application developers can construct policies which
accurately govern their resources.
We chose to use XACML [36]. XACML is an XML-
based language for expressing generic policies and at-
tributes. A Policy Decision Point (PDP) takes a policy and
a set of attributes, and makes an access control decision.
We chose XACML because it is generic enough to express
a wide range of attributes, and has an open-source imple-
mentation [22] which is implemented in the language of
our prototype: Java. As we will show in Section 6, it is
possible to build XACML-generating policy tools which
make XACML easy enough to use for administrators and
application developers.
R CA P
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Figure 1: The parties in the SHEMP system. The circles rep-
resent individuals or organizations and the boxes represent ma-
chines. The arrows indicate trust relationships between the par-
ties; an arrow from A to B means “A trusts B”.
5 SHEMP
The goal of SHEMP is to allow a relying party Bob to
be able to make valid trust judgments about Alice upon
receiving a Proxy Certificate from her—and this validity
must reflect the opinions of Bob and Alice about the desk-
top infrastructure involved. Bob should have some reason
to believe that Alice authorized the issuance of her Proxy
Certificate for the intended purpose(s), and that the pri-
vate key described in the Proxy Certificate is authentic.
Equipped with the tools of Section 4, we designed and
implemented the SHEMP system.
When a user Alice wishes to use her private key, she logs
into the SHEMP repository from her client desktop, gen-
erates a temporary keypair on her desktop, and then re-
quests a PC which includes the public portion of her tem-
porary keypair and is signed by her permanent private
key on the repository. The PC is only valid for a short
period of time, and includes a snapshot of the environ-
ment in which the PC was generated. This snapshot de-
scribes the security attributes of the repository and client
desktop, and allows applications to decide for themselves
how trustworthy the private key described by PC really is.
The SHEMP system attempts to leverage secure hardware
when it can, but it does not require secure hardware. Con-
cretely, SHEMP allows keypairs on the repository and the
client to be generated and used in secure coprocessors.
Additionally, the framework for describing the security
attributes of repositories and client desktops allows users
and administrators to express the presence and quality of
secure hardware—and relying parties to use this informa-
tion when making their trust judgments.
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5.1 The SHEMP Architecture
The Players Initially, there are three familiar parties in-
volved in SHEMP: a CA, a user Alice (A), and a user’s
machine (Matisse). As in any typical PKI, Alice trusts her
CA to certify members of her population (including her-
self). This relationship is depicted as a solid arrow from
Alice to the CA in Figure 1. In order for the CA to trust
Alice, it must believe her identity and that she has the pri-
vate key matching the public key in her certificate request
(typically a Registration Authority verifies Alice’s identity
on the CA’s behalf). Once the CA believes Alice’s identity
is authentic and that she owns the private key, the CA will
express its trust in Alice in the form of a CA-signed iden-
tity certificate. This relationship is depicted as a dashed
edge from the CA to Alice in Figure 1.
For an application running on Alice’s machine (Matisse)
to trust certificates signed by the CA (such as Alice’s), it
usually needs to have the CA certificate installed. This
relationship is represented by the edge from Matisse to
the CA in Figure 1. To illustrate a concrete example of
the necessity of this relationship, assume that some orga-
nization uses S/MIME mail. If Alice and Bob both have
identity certificates signed by the CA and Bob sends Al-
ice a signed message, then Alice’s mail program needs
to know Bob’s certificate and it needs to trust the entity
which vouched for Bob’s identity (the CA).
In addition to the three familiar parties described above,
the SHEMP system introduces three more: a Repository
Administrator (R in Figure 1) who runs the key reposi-
tory(s), a Platform Administrator (P in Figure 1) who is
in charge of the platforms in the domain (such as Matisse),
and at least one key repository (Rep 0 in Figure 1).
The Repository Administrator is in charge of operating
the key repository. Since the repository contains the entire
population’s private keys and is thus a target for attacks, it
must be maintained with care. Concretely, the Repository
Administrator is in charge of loading private keys into the
repository and vouching for the repository’s identity and
security level (these will be discussed below). Thus, it is
necessary for the CA to trust the Repository Administra-
tor. Since the Repository Administrator is a member of
the CA’s domain (in fact, probably part of the same orga-
nizational unit—such as Dartmouth College Computing
Services), it trusts the CA as well. This relationship is
depicted by the edge connecting the Repository Adminis-
trator to the CA in Figure 1.
The Platform Administrator is in charge of the platforms
that end users (e.g., Alice) will use. At the base level,
the Platform Administrator has the same responsibilities
as a typical system administrator: configuring machines,
installing and upgrading software, applying patches, etc.
R
R
CACACA
CA
P
P
A
ARep 0 Matisse
Figure 2: The entities, trust relationships, and initial certifi-
cates in SHEMP. The boxes inside of the dashed area represent
certificates. In this figure, all three certificates are signed by the
CA, and are issued to the Repository Administrator, Platform
Administrator, and Alice respectively.
Additionally, the Platform Administrator is in charge of
creating and vouching for platform identities and security
properties (discussed below). Since the Platform Admin-
istrator is in charge of the nodes that will be using the
keys stored in the repository, the CA must trust the Plat-
form Administrator. Since the Platform Administrator is a
part of the CA’s domain (again, possibly part of the same
organizational unit), it trusts the CA. The relationship is
shown in Figure 1 as the edge connecting the Platform
Administrator to the CA.
The last entity involved is the actual key repository which
holds the users’ private keys. As with individual platforms
(e.g., Matisse), the repository trusts the CA. This relation-
ship makes it possible for entities with CA-signed certifi-
cates to establish SSL connections to the repository. Since
the repository trusts the CA, it believes the identity of an
entity with a CA-signed certificate. This relationship is
represented by the edge between the repository and the
CA in Figure 1
There could be more entities involved in the system. For
example, there will most certainly be multiple users (e.g.,
Alices) and platforms (e.g., Matisses). Further there could
be any number of CAs in virtually any valid architec-
ture (hierarchy, mesh, etc.). There could also be multiple
repositories with different Repository Administrators, as
well as multiple Platform Administrators. The only con-
straint that must be enforced is that the multiple parties
form a valid chain of certificates. The set of entities in
Figure 1 is the smallest set which is necessary and suffi-
cient to describe the system.
Identity Certificates Setup The way SHEMP (and PKI in
general) represents trust is via certificates. From the initial
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CACACA
CA
P
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ARep 0
Rep. Mat.
Mat.
Platform
Cert
Repository
Cert
Figure 3: The administrators issue identity certificates to the
repository and Matisse. The dashed edges indicate the issuing
of a certificate, and the resulting certificates are added to the
certificate store.
trust relationships between the entities in Figure 1, a num-
ber of certificates can be immediately issued. Figure 2
illustrates these initial certificates; they are contained in
the dashed box which could possibly represent an LDAP
directory where users go to locate certificates.
The certificates are issued from the CA to entities which
have a mutual trust relationship with the CA. Since the
administrators and Alice all have such a relationship with
the CA, they are all issued identity certificates. The certifi-
cates not shown in Figure 2 are the CA certificates which
are installed at the key repository and at the platform. As
previously discussed, these certificates are necessary to al-
low things like client-side SSL connections, and are rep-
resented by the one-directional edges in Figure 2.
The first phase of setup begins when machines are added
to the domain. As a repository is added, the Repository
Administrator must take a number of steps to set it up.
First, he must generate a keypair for the repository. This
keypair can be generated in a number of ways depend-
ing on what type of platform the repository runs on. For
instance, if the repository runs in a IBM 4758, then the
keypair ought to be generated there, so as not to be com-
promised. If the repository runs on a Bear platform, then
the keypair should be generated inside of the TPM.
Second, the Repository Administrator binds the public
portion of that keypair to an identifier for the repository.
A repository could be identified by a name, a hardware
MAC address, the hash of the newly-generated public key,
etc. The only restriction that SHEMP imposes is that this
identifier uniquely identify the repository. The binding
of the public key to the identifier is accomplished via the
Repository Identity Certificate issued by the Repository
Administrator (depicted as the certificate issued from the
Repository Administrator to Repository 0 in Figure 3). A
similar procedure is performed by the Platform Adminis-
trator each time a new machine is added to the domain.
First, the Platform Administrator generates a new keypair
on the platform, using the most secure method available
to it (e.g., an IBM 4758 or a TPM). Second, the Platform
Administrator binds the public portion of the keypair to a
unique identifier for the platform. This binding is repre-
sented as the Platform Identity Certificate (depicted as the
certificate issued from the Platform Administrator to Ma-
tisse in Figure 3). As with the repository, SHEMP is ag-
nostic to the specific mechanism used to identify the plat-
form, but administrators should use the “least spoofable”
identifier possible. For example, if a TPM is present, the
TPM’s Endorsement Key could be used, providing a more
secure identifier than a hardware MAC address (which is
easily spoofed).
Attribute Certificates Setup The final phase of setting
up the system involves issuing attribute certificates to the
appropriate entities. These attribute certificates are used
to bind the security level of the machines (i.e., the repos-
itory and client platform) to the machine’s identifier, and
to bind a user’s delegation policy to the user’s identity.
As the Repository Administrator configures the reposi-
tory, he must also assign some domain-specific security
level to the repository. Concretely, the security level is
expressed by the Repository Administrator generating and
signing some XML attributes for the repository. The idea
is for the administrator to make some signed XML state-
ments such as “This repository runs on a Bear platform”,
“This repository is in a secure location and guarded by
armed guards.”, etc. These attributes can be arbitrarily
complex, and are stuffed into a signed XML statement
called the Repository Attribute Certificate (RAC). The
RAC is identified by the same identifier that the Reposi-
tory Administrator used in the Repository Identity Certifi-
cate, and thus binds the repository to its XML attributes.
The RAC is then signed by the Repository Administrator
and placed in a well-known location, such as an LDAP
directory. This procedure is shown in Figure 4.
As the Platform Administrator configures new machines,
she constructs some XML attributes for the platform and
signs them. These attributes are expressed in XML, and
can state any domain-specific properties that the Platform
Administrator feels are important in determining the se-
curity level of the machine. Examples may include state-
ments such as “This machine is inside the firewall”, “This
machine is a Bear platform”, “This machine was patched
on April 21, 2004”, etc. Like the RAC, these attributes can
be arbitrarily complex and are stuffed into a signed XML
statement called the Platform Attribute Certificate (PAC).
The PAC is identified by the same unique identifier that
the Platform Administrator used to identify the platform
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Figure 4: The administrators issue attribute certificates to the repository and Matisse which contains their security level expressed
in XML. The CA issues an attribute certificate to Alice which contains her Key Usage Policy (KUP). The KUP is an XACML
policy which specifies Alice’s policy.
in the Platform Identity Certificate. Again, machines with
no secure hardware may be identified by a hardware MAC
address, whereas a Bear platform may be identified by the
TPM’s endorsement key. In any case, the PAC binds the
client platform’s identity to its XML attributes. The PAC
is signed by the Platform Administrator and is placed in
a well-known location such as an LDAP directory. This
procedure is shown in Figure 4.
The last part of the setup occurs when a user Alice visits
the CA for the first time in order to get her identity cer-
tificate issued. Alice goes through the standard identity
vetting process, eventually proving her identity to the CA.
At the CA, Alice also gets a chance to express her Key
Usage Policy (KUP), which governs how her key is to be
used. For example, Alice may specify “If my key lives in
an IBM 4758 repository, and I request a Proxy Certificate
from a Bear platform, grant the Proxy Certificate full priv-
ileges. If my key lives in a Bear repository, and I request
a Proxy Certificate from any machine outside the firewall,
allow my key to be used for encryption only. etc.” This
KUP is expressed as an XACML policy, and is signed by
the CA. The signed KUP is identified by Alice’s name and
is placed into the LDAP along with her identity certificate.
The System in Motion Once setup is completed, Alice is
free to wander throughout the domain and use her key. For
example, assume that she needs to register for classes via
an SSL client-side authenticated Web site. Alice begins
by finding a computer which is acting as a client (i.e., has
our SHEMP client software installed, and has an Platform
Identity Certificate and PAC in the directory). For illustra-
tion, assume Alice walks up to the client named Matisse.
Matisse first connects to the repository and establishes a
client-side SSL connection. The Repository and Platform
Identity Certificates are used to negotiate this connection.
Recall that the Repository and Platform Identity Certifi-
cates are signed by the appropriate administrators (Repos-
itory and Platform, respectively), and that the administra-
tors have CA-signed certificates (or a valid chain of cer-
tificates back to the CA). The implication is that there is a
valid certificate chain from each of the platforms back to
the CA. Since both the repository and platform trust the
CA, they have good reason to believe the client-side SSL
authentication.
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The second step is for Alice to authenticate herself to the
repository. SHEMP is agnostic with respect to how au-
thentication is accomplished. For prototyping purposes,
Alice uses a username/password, but for stronger secu-
rity, Alice could use an authentication technique which
cannot be intercepted by rogue processes on the client.
For instance, Alice could use some other keypair (possi-
bly stored on a token) for authentication purposes or she
could use biometrics, etc.
Once both Matisse and Alice have authenticated, the
repository software uses Matisse’s identifier to look up
Matisse’s PAC. The repository may also fetch Alice’s
identity certificate and KUP if it is not locally stored on
the repository (possibly to save space on the repository).
Once the repository has gathered all of the policy infor-
mation about the Matisse and Alice (e.g., the PAC, KUP,
and Alice’s identity certificate), it will acknowledge Al-
ice’s and Matisse’s authentication, and waits for a Proxy
Certificate request from Matisse.
Matisse will then generate a temporary keypair for Alice
to use. Again, this may be generated a number of ways
depending on the resources available to the client. For
example, if the client is a Bear platform, it could gener-
ate a keypair in the TPM so that the key will never leave
the TPM. If the client is a standard unarmed desktop, it
may generate a keypair with OpenSSL. In any event, Ma-
tisse generates an unsigned Proxy Certificate containing
the public portion of the temporary key, and sends it to
the repository to be signed by Alice’s private key.
The repository must then decide if it should sign the re-
quest with Alice’s private key. The repository takes the
security levels of itself and Matisse (contained in the RAC
and PAC, respectively) and generates an XACML request
containing the attributes. This XACML request and Al-
ice’s KUP are then evaluated to determine whether the
operation is allowed. Concretely, an XACML PDP run-
ning on the repository as part of the repository software
will make this decision. If the operation is allowed, the
repository will place the attributes found in the PAC and
RAC, along with Alice’s KUP into the Proxy Certificate’s
PCI extension, and then sign the Proxy Certificate with
Alice’s private key. Placing the attributes and KUP into
the PCI allows the Proxy Certificate’s relying party to see
the security properties of Alice’s environment. The signed
Proxy Certificate is then returned to Alice.
Alice now presents her Proxy Certificate which, along
with her identity certificate, form a chain: one which in-
cludes her real public key which is signed by the CA, and
an X.509 Proxy Certificate which contains a short-lived
temporary public key, signed by her real private key.
Applications Traditional PKI uses of private keys include
decryption, signing, and authentication. The PCs gener-
ated by SHEMP can by used for any of these operations,
although the short lifespan of the Proxy Certificate adds
some complexity. For example, if Bob encrypts some-
thing for Alice using her PC’s public key, and the PC ex-
pires before Alice decrypts the message, then she loses
the message. If Alice signs something with her temporary
private key, and Bob attempts to verify the message af-
ter Alice’s PC has expired, the signature is meaningless.
Having Bob deal with Alice’s long-term certificate would
be ideal, but then Alice needs a way to ask the repository
to perform private key operations on her behalf.
We designed and implemented decryption and signing
proxies on the repository to solve this problem. They
allow Alice to turn a message encrypted with her long-
term public key into a message encrypted with her tem-
porary public key, and turn a signature generated with her
temporary private key into a signature generated with her
long-term one. This way, Bob just has to deal with Al-
ice’s long-term certificate, and is not required to know
anything about SHEMP. These applications do not ex-
plore novel cryptographic techniques such as proxy re-
encryption schemes [1], but are still novel contributions
in themselves, as they explore the use of PCs for standard
private key operations; until now, they have only been
used for authentication and dynamic delegation.
6 Evaluation
In Section 3, we argued that a solution to the desktop PKI
problem must be secure, usable, and give users mobility.
SHEMP meets these criteria, and thus makes desktops us-
able PKI clients.
6.1 Security
Before we offer a security analysis of SHEMP, we state an
important assumption which holds throughout our analy-
sis: the level of security in SHEMP (or any system) can-
not be measured with a single bit. It is not the goal of our
analysis to conclude some meaningless statement such as
“SHEMP is secure.” Rather, our analysis aims to illustrate
how SHEMP can be used to increase security in a wide
range of environments with possibly different threat mod-
els. We show how SHEMP creates a framework which
makes it possible to build a secure PKI environment (i.e.,
one which minimizes the risk and impact of key disclo-
sure) under an array of threat models.
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6.1.1 Minimizing Risk
SHEMP decreases the risk of private key disclosure in
a number of ways. First, SHEMP removes users’ keys
from the desktop and places them in a credential reposi-
tory which is administered by a professional. Placing keys
in a repository shrinks the TCB. The TCB is expanded
to cover the desktop only when needed, and only for a
short period of time. Second, by using secure hardware
when available, SHEMP can reduce the TCB size even
further. Finally, by including environmental information
(i.e., repository and platform attributes) in each user’s PC,
relying parties can decide for themselves whether they
should trust the request.
Getting Keys Off of the Desktop Since the TCB is a fi-
nite set of software and (possibly hardware) components,
we can represent TCBs with set notation as the set TCB.
We consider the TCB of the current client-side approach
to be the union of the TCBs of all of the n client desktops
in the domain. We denote the this total TCB as T , where:
T =
n⋃
i=1
TCBi .
If any one of the n desktops in Alice’s domain have the
keyjacking malware installed, then anyone who uses that
desktop will have their key stolen or misused. Solutions
which encourage mobility (i.e., allowing users to store
their private keys on USB dongles) actually make mat-
ters worse, as a compromised machine is likely to service
a number of users. In this case, all of the users of the com-
promised machine will have their key stolen or misused.
If we assume that c of the desktops are infected with key-
jacking malware, then Alice has a c/n chance of having
her key stolen or misused. If the desktops are all roughly
the same in terms of OS and software, and an attacker
can compromise one of them, then it is likely that c can
approach n very quickly (e.g., if the keyjacking malware
were propagated by a worm or virus), leaving it almost
certain that Alice will be keyjacked.
Under the SHEMP approach, there is only one machine
which houses users’ private keys: the key repository.1
Centralization shrinks the TCB from the n desktops to
just one key repository when no one is using the system.
When Alice needs to use her key, she requests that the
repository extend the TCB to cover her machine during
the duration of her session. Concretely, this is accom-
plished by the repository signing a short-lived PC for a
1Actually, the SHEMP design allows for a number of repositories,
but we envision a small number of repositories in relation to clients.
temporary key on Alice’s current desktop. The TCB at
some time t is the repository’s TCB plus the TCB of what-
ever clients are involved in active sessions (i.e., have valid
PCs) at time t. If we let TCBrep be the repository’s TCB
and p be the number of valid PCs at time t, we can denote
SHEMP’s total TCB at time t as T (t), where:
T (t) = TCBrep ∪
p⋃
i=1
TCBi .
Assume that organization S uses SHEMP, and that orga-
nization O does not. Additionally, assume that they have
the same number of users and desktops (denoted n), and
that one desktop is serving as S’s key repository (leaving
S with n− 1 clients). The TCB at S is never greater than
O’s TCB, i.e., ∀t : |T (t)| ≤ |T | because:
∣∣∣∣∣TCBrep ∪
p⋃
i=1
TCBi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
n⋃
i=1
TCBi
∣∣∣∣∣ .
To see why this statement is true, assume that every user
in S has a valid PC at some time t. In this case p = n− 1,
which yields the same size TCB as O. The implication is
that if any client desktop does not have a valid PC, then the
SHEMP approach shrinks the TCB. Furthermore, Alice’s
policy statement may disqualify some clients from using
her key, thus shrinking the TCB even further.
SHEMP also minimizes the risk of private key disclosure
by placing all of the private keys under the control of a
trusted entity: the Repository Administrator. The Repos-
itory Administrator will likely be closely related to the
organizational unit which issues certificates (i.e., the Cer-
tificate Authority). A specialist is more likely to protect
the private keys than an individual user is. Thus, letting
a specialist care for the private keys decreases the risk of
private key disclosure.
Using Secure Hardware As we discussed in Section 4,
secure hardware can shrink the TCB. Highly secure de-
vices such as the IBM 4758 can provide a separate secu-
rity domain from their host, while secure platforms such
as Bear can provide some level of protection, and cost
significantly less than an IBM 4758. SHEMP reduces the
TCB (and hence, the risk of private key disclosure) further
by taking advantage of secure hardware, when and where
available.
Since the keys reside in a central location (i.e., the repos-
itory), we envision that the repository will utilize some
form of secure hardware. The repository application
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could be running in secure hardware, and the private keys
could be stored inside. The organization’s threat model
should dictate the level of secure hardware that they adopt.
For maximum security, the repository should run in a de-
vice such as the IBM 4758, and the clients should min-
imally use something like Bear. The use of secure hard-
ware allows organizations with SHEMP to shrink the TCB
even further, thus further decreasing the risk of private key
disclosure.
Describing the TCB Finally, SHEMP minimizes the risk
of key disclosure through the use of the environmental at-
tributes (found in the Repository and Platform Attribute
Certificate) and KUPs found in each Proxy Certificate’s
PCI extension. SHEMP mandates that all of this informa-
tion be included. This approach gives useful information
to relying parties, allowing them to adjust their trust in
the client based on the environment. Relying parties are
thus aware when a client generates a temporary key un-
der conditions which are likely to result in key disclosure,
and have the possibility to limit the key’s use. The us-
ability of the policy statements in the context of building
applications will be examined below.
6.1.2 Minimizing Impacts
In addition to minimizing the risk of a private key dis-
closure, SHEMP minimizes the impact of such a disclo-
sure. First, a successful keyjacking-style attack only gives
the attacker access to a temporary keypair, and only for a
limited period of time. Second, SHEMP reduces the im-
pact of a disclosure to the organization by simplifying and
shrinking the size of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
Finally, SHEMP makes forensics easier by consolidating
(and possibly protecting) the audit trail.
Closing the Window SHEMP minimizes the impact of
private key disclosure at the client by only allowing the
temporary key to be used for a short time. Under SHEMP,
the key issued on the client’s desktop is valid for a num-
ber of hours (our prototype defaults to two hours). This
small time window limits the opportunity for a success-
ful attacker to use the victim’s key. The set of operations
that an attacker can perform with a stolen key is possibly
further limited by the victim’s KUP. A successful attacker
may not have access to the encryption or signing proxies
(or other resources in the domain) depending on how the
victim has set her KUP. Therefore, a restrictive KUP can
also limit the impacts of a private key disclosure.
Revocation SHEMP minimizes the impact to the organi-
zation in the case of a key compromise. In many status
quo PKIs, compromised keys are revoked by placing their
certificate into a CRL or an Online Certificate Status Pro-
tocol (OCSP) server. Keeping CRLs up to date and dis-
tributing them are non-trivial problems in PKI space.
Since only the SHEMP repository can use Alice’s pri-
vate key, SHEMP (like SEM [2]) can effectively revoke
a user’s keypair by changing the authentication informa-
tion at the repository. Changing Alice’s authentication in-
formation results in Alice (or anyone with Alice’s login
information) being unable to log on to the repository and
make requests to use her private key. This approach re-
duces the size of CRLs and the amount of work for the
administrative staff.
The Audit Trail SHEMP minimizes the impact of a pri-
vate key compromise by consolidating the audit trail used
for gathering forensic information. Since all accesses to
use Alice’s private key are received by the SHEMP repos-
itory, there exists a central log of Alice’s private key activ-
ity on the repository. In the event that Alice’s key is com-
promised, investigators need only look in one place for
information. Furthermore, since the SHEMP repository
software can run inside of secure hardware, SHEMP can
secure the logs themselves by keeping them inside of the
hardware. The logs could be cryptographically protected
to prevent tamper or viewing by unauthorized individuals.
In the event of a key compromise, the organization would
not only have a central location for the logs, but can pro-
tect them against modification.
6.2 Usability
In order to show that SHEMP is usable, we need to show
that developers and administrators can understand and
construct valid policies to solve real security problems—
i.e., the policy mechanism must be a valid medium for
developers and users to express their mental models. Fur-
thermore, we need to show that the computational over-
head introduced by SHEMP’s policy mechanism and use
of extra keypairs does not make the system unusable from
an end user’s perspective.
User Study To see whether the policy mechanisms were
usable, we conducted a user study consisting of eight sub-
jects which are highly representative of the types of peo-
ple who would be tasked with constructing SHEMP poli-
cies. Our user study outlined some real application de-
signs taken from Dartmouth’s Grid community. We gave
the application designs to subjects who would likely fill
the roles of the Repository Administrator, the Platform
Administrator, and the CA. We were interested in evalu-
ating whether the parties could generate a meaningful set
of policies which represent a given mental model, how
many tries it took them, and their feedback regarding the
difficulty of their task.
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Once users had completed the test, they were asked to
complete and return a survey. Compiling the survey data
led to a few interesting discoveries. First, there was an
inverse correlation between the number of machines un-
der the subject’s control and the number of mistakes the
subject made. The subjects who administered the most
machines made the fewest mistakes. Second, of the sub-
jects who had configured other application security poli-
cies (such as Apache or MySQL), all but one of them said
SHEMP was easier to configure. The one who said it was
harder recommended using a GUI, and giving a users a
way to go back. Many thought that the structure of the
tool was helpful; they liked the question and answer tone
rather than having a random access configuration file to
edit. Third, no one reported anything particularly confus-
ing about SHEMP, and everyone mentioned in one way
or another that they would like a GUI with the potential
to go back to the previous set of options. Finally, the sub-
jects leaned to use the tool rather quickly: no one reported
running any of the scripts more than three times.
The overall results were positive. Half of the subjects built
perfect policies, and of the remaining half, no one missed
more than one operation out of eight. Every mistake re-
sulted from a typographical error, such as a misspelled
word or failure to respect case sensitivity. These results
suggest that a policy generation tool which does not al-
low users to make such mistakes (possibly by doing input
validation or presenting users with a graphical menu of
options to choose from) would yield better results. The
results indicate that the SHEMP policy mechanisms are
usable, but a good policy construction tool is essential.
Performance In order to show that the overhead intro-
duced by SHEMP does not make the system unusable to
end users, we conducted a performance analysis. Perfor-
mance is not the most interesting aspect of SHEMP, but
since a third party is contacted for all private key opera-
tions, we expected a slowdown and wanted some quan-
tification. If SHEMP keeps users waiting for long periods
of time to perform key operations, then users are likely to
find faster solutions, even at the expense of security.
We used our prototype to measure the overhead of PC
generation and the decryption and signing proxies. As
a baseline, we compared SHEMP to a simple Java appli-
cation which we call the SHEMP CryptoAccessory.
The CryptoAccessory performs the standard crypto-
graphic operations (encryption, decryption, signing, and
verification) using a locally-stored keypair, and without
third-party involvement.
We measured the slowdown for three operations (Gener-
ate Proxy Certificate, Decrypt, and Sign) on three network
configurations. The operations consisted of generating an
RSA keypair, using it to decrypt a message, and then us-
Op Local Same Seg Diff. Net Avg.
Gen PC 3.69% 1.94% 4.33% 3.32%
Decrypt 54.95% 42.64% 54.42% 50.67%
Sign 40.22% 49.04% 57.51% 48.92%
Table 2: Slowdown of SHEMP compared to local private key
operations.
ing it to sign a message. For the first configuration, we
put the SHEMP client and the repository on the same ma-
chine, thus eliminating network delay altogether. In the
second configuration, we placed the client and repository
on the same Ethernet segment, so as to simulate a Lo-
cal Area Network. For the final configuration, we put the
client and repository on different networks by putting the
client on our campus-wide wireless network.
We averaged ten runs with our CryptoAccessory and
SHEMP, and then calculated the slowdown introduced by
the SHEMP overhead as a result of using the proxies on
the repository to perform the operations. The SHEMP
overhead also includes the time for the policy check on
the repository. The repository (and decryption and sign-
ing proxies) locate all of the policies and attribute certifi-
cates, verify their signatures, and pass the information to
the PDP for evaluation. Performance results are given in
Table 2.
The column labelled “Avg.” is an average over the results
of the different configurations. The results indicate that
only 3.32% of the time spent generating a PC is used by
SHEMP. This extra time that SHEMP introduces is used
to transport the unsigned PC over the network, verify the
current environment’s attribute certificates, perform a pol-
icy check against Alice’s KUP, sign the PC, and return the
signed PC to Alice. The other 96.68% of the time is spent
generating the temporary keypair on the client.
The performance results for the proxies are less impres-
sive, indicating that roughly half of the time spent per-
forming the operation is introduced by SHEMP. In these
cases, SHEMP uses the time to transport the messages
over the network, perform a policy check, perform a pub-
lic key operation (either to verify the message or to en-
crypt the message with Alice’s temporary public key),
and perform a private key operation (either to sign a mes-
sage with Alice’s long-term private key or decrypt a mes-
sage which was encrypted with her long-term public key).
From s user’s perspective, using SHEMP doubles the time
it takes to perform a private key operation.
However, this is not as bad as it appears. First, the ex-
tra time needed for SHEMP may not be noticeable to
humans. Over the average of the ten decryption opera-
tions performed in the “Different Network” configuration,
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SHEMP takes the time of the operation from 222.3 mil-
liseconds to 487.8 milliseconds. Human perception can-
not detect the slowdown. If the network is lagging, then
the time of the operation is likely to grow even more, but
then any application using the network will feel a loss of
performance as well. Second, it is possible to reduce the
overhead by using cryptographic acceleration hardware.
Our prototype repository used the default Java crypto-
graphic provider to perform the operations. If we run the
repository in an IBM 4758, we could exploit the crypto-
graphic acceleration subsystem to improve performance.
Our performance analysis indicates that the overhead in-
troduced by SHEMP does not make the system unusable.
While the performance hit is statistically significant, it can
be improved via specialized hardware, and users are un-
likely to notice the slowdown anyway.
6.3 Mobility
SHEMP gives users mobility without sacrificing security.
In our prototype testbed, we have three client desktops
which are assigned a different set of security attributes.
The desktops represent low-, medium-, and high-security
machines (high-security machines being ones armed with
a TPM). We are able to access our private key from each
one, subject to the restrictions in our KUP. The mobil-
ity of SHEMP stems from the fact that it is based on the
MyProxy design. The use of the credential repository ap-
proach allows SHEMP users to access their key from any-
where, provided that they can access the key repository.
MyProxy’s mobility is what led us to use it as a foundation
for the SHEMP design in the first place. In all fairness, we
can claim that SHEMP is as mobile as MyProxy.
SHEMP excels in the security properties which are main-
tained during migration. Again, the current client-side in-
frastructure makes migration risky by using unsafe trans-
port formats. The use of a secure transport format such
as Sacred [23, 24, 25] could provide some benefits, but it
is not necessarily a part of what we consider the current
client-side infrastructure. MyProxy is an improvement in
that private keys typically stay on the repository, and only
PC are given to the user. However, MyProxy does not
consider Alice’s environment when deciding whether or
not to allow Alice to use her private key. As long as Alice
(or anyone else) can authenticate to the repository, it will
grant her full access to her key.
SHEMP takes the MyProxy approach a step further by ac-
tually checking the security properties of the current en-
vironment, and then consulting Alice’s KUP to see if it
should grant the request. Concretely, the SHEMP repos-
itory uses the platform authentication step to identify the
requesting platform. As discussed in Section 5, the repos-
itory gives the attributes contained in the Platform and
Repository Attribute Certificates along with Alice’s KUP
to a PDP for evaluation. If the PDP returns “Permit”, then
the request is granted. SHEMP’s use of environmental
information in making its access decision gives users the
same amount of mobility as the MyProxy approach, while
simultaneously providing extra security.
7 Summary
This research began when we discovered numerous prob-
lems with the current client-side approach to deploying
PKI. By exploiting the large TCB of modern desktops, an
attacker can either steal private keys outright or use them
at will, leaving desktops unsuitable for PKI. Starting with
the problems of the current approach, we derived a set of
criteria for making desktops usable PKI clients. As we es-
tablished in Section 3, any solution which claims to make
desktops usable for PKI must address security, mobility,
and usability.
Starting with the approach employed by the Grid com-
munity (i.e., the MyProxy online credential repository),
we designed a system which makes desktops usable PKI
clients: SHEMP. SHEMP meets the criteria we estab-
lished in Section 3. In Section 6, we offered a security
analysis of SHEMP, illustrated how it minimizes the risks
and impacts of a private key disclosure, and how it can de-
fend against the keyjacking attacks of Section 2. We dis-
cussed how SHEMP maintains security while providing
mobility through the use of environmental attributes and
Key Usage Policies. Finally, we showed that SHEMP is
usable by presenting the results of our usability study and
performance analysis. The results indicate the SHEMP’s
policy framework can be used to accurately capture a
mental model of the system given the right tools, and that
SHEMP’s overhead is imperceivable by humans.
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